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The 2008 crisis revived doubts about growth and resuscitated the debate
on secular stagnation initiated by Hansen in 1938. Particularly in a post-crisis
context of zero or very low growth, Schumpeterian theory may seem to be
outdated. Nevertheless, in this article, we show that it remains a valid concep-
tual framework.
We begin by recalling the main highlights of Schumpeter's model of
growth. We then argue that this conceptual framework remains relevant to
many aspects of growth, notably secular stagnation, structural reforms and the
debate on inequality. We show that because of creative destruction, the
growth in productivity induced by innovation is underestimated. In addition,
we explain why the Schumpeterian framework calls for a complementarity
between structural reforms and macroeconomic policy. Finally, we show the
positive impact of innovation and creative destruction on social mobility.
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Even as macroeconomics seemed to have succeeded in containing
the likelihood of a serious recession, the 2008 crisis shook many macro-
economic certainties and reopened debate about the sustainability of
growth. In reality, the debate on the increasing weakness of growth is
much older: it emerged in the 1930s, and media coverage dates back
to 1972, when the Massachusetts Institute of Technology published the
Meadows Report, The Limits to Growth. This report showed that the
pursuit of exponential economic growth could only lead to exceeding
material limits, and that growth would stop because of both the
system's internal dynamics as well as external factors, first of all energy.Revue de l’OFCE, 157 (2018)
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countries has put questions about growth back at the heart of the
economic debate. Some have perceived the crisis as a harbinger that
growth is running out of steam (Gordon). For others, the crisis has
highlighted the phenomenon of widening inequalities and the margin-
alization of the middle classes. Finally, the crisis has revived debates on
growth policies, especially between those who favour purely macroe-
conomic policies and those who advocate structural reforms.
In this article, after briefly presenting the highlights of the
Schumpeterian model, we defend the idea that this conceptual frame-
work has not been invalidated by the crisis and that it remains relevant
in three ways. First, we show that productivity growth is likely to be
poorly measured, casting doubt on the idea of secular stagnation and
rehabilitating the theory of creative destruction. Furthermore, the
Schumpeterian paradigm demonstrates the need for structural reforms
to support innovation and growth. Finally, it helps to rethink the
debate on inequality by showing the positive impact of innovation and
creative destruction in promoting social mobility. 
1. The Schumpeterian Model
The Schumpeterian growth model developed in 1987 by Philippe
Aghion and Peter Howitt (Aghion and Howitt, 1992) is based on four
ideas inspired by Schumpeter.
The first idea is that long-term growth results from innovation.
Without innovation, the economy is stationary. A stationary economy
prevailed before capitalism and works like a closed loop, reproducing
itself identically.
The second idea is that innovation does not fall from the sky and
that it is an eminently social process. It results from investment deci-
sions (in research and development, training, the purchase of
computers, etc.) on the part of entrepreneurs, who are seen as the
pillars of capitalism. Unlike in the classics and the Marxist vision,
Schumpeter's entrepreneurs are not related to any particular social
group. They are the ones who innovate,1 who create. They respond to
positive or negative incentives from institutions and public policies: for
example, the presence of hyperinflation or insufficient property rights
protection in a country discourages innovation.
Technical Progress and Growth since the Crisis 57The third idea is the concept of creative destruction: new innovations
make previous innovations obsolete; in other words, Schumpeterian
growth is the scene of permanent conflict between the old and the new;
it tells the story of the innovators of yesterday who turn into daily
managers falling into a routine, trying to prevent or delay the entry of
new competitors into their sector of activity.
The fourth idea is that productivity growth can be generated either
by innovation “at the boundaries” or by the imitation of more
advanced technologies. The more a country develops (that is to say,
approaches the technological frontier), the more innovation becomes
the engine of growth and takes over from the accumulation of capital
and technological catch-up (imitation).
2. The Debate over Secular Stagnation
The 2008 crisis has revived doubts about growth and once again
brought up the concept of secular stagnation. This is not a new idea. In
1938, the economist Alvin Hansen explained during his Presidential
Address to the American Economics Association (AEA) that, in his view
the United States was condemned to weak growth in the future. His
reasoning was based on a predictable slowdown in population growth
and a lack of aggregate demand. In 1938, the world economy was just
recovering from the effects of the 1929 crisis, and Hansen did not
anticipate a Second World War that would result in boosting public
spending and thus aggregate demand.
More recently, in regard to the Internet revolution, Robert Solow
noted in 1987 the paradox that “you can see the computer age every-
where but in the productivity statistics”. Solow noted that the spread
of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the US
economy did not seem to be translating into significant gains in
productivity and growth. This finding was shared by Robert Gordon
(2000), for whom the Internet revolution is not comparable to previous
industrial revolutions; productivity growth has remained low, and it is
benefiting only the ICT-producing sectors. For Gordon (2012), the risk
1. Schumpeter distinguishes inventions, i.e. the discovery of new scientific knowledge, from
innovations, i.e. the introduction of these inventions into the productive sphere. For Schumpeter, it is
the innovations that explain the dynamics of growth, and the bearer of innovations is the
entrepreneur who introduces the inventions provided by technical progress into the economic
process.
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idea that the great innovations have already taken place, using the
parable of the fruit tree: the best fruit are also the ones that are picked
the most easily (low-hanging fruit), after which the picking becomes
more difficult and less juicy.
In addition, the onset of the 2008 subprime crisis led Larry Summers
along with others to use the term “secular stagnation” to describe a
situation they consider similar to that described by Hansen in 1938.
The idea put forward by Summers is that demand for capital goods is
so weak that it would require a negative interest rate to restore full
employment and keep output at its potential.
The idea of secular stagnation has gained emulators. Indeed, eight
years after the subprime crisis, in 2016 most developed economies are
still plagued by a lag in production, with serious output gaps. This
situation contrasts sharply with these economies' past cyclical behav-
iour, when GDP was rapidly brought back to its potential. This leads to
questioning the causes of the disruption of the growth path that has
occurred for almost ten years, reviving the debate around “secular
stagnation”.
The thesis of secular stagnation related to an insufficiency of supply
is refuted by several economists: thus, Crafts (2002) evaluated the US
economy over a very long period and showed that the contribution of
the diffusion of information and communication technology (ICT) to
output and productivity has grown considerably faster than the contri-
bution of the steam engine and the distribution of electricity. In
addition, Fraumeni (2001) and Litan and Rivlin (2001) showed that the
evaluation of growth has been low because many forms of improve-
ment in the quality of certain services (trade, health, etc.) resulting
from the diffusion of ICT are not taken into account in national
accounts statistics.
Schumpeterian economists have a more optimistic view of the
future than Gordon, for several reasons:
— The ICT revolution has drastically and radically improved the
technology of the production of ideas (Dale Jorgenson) by
creating positive diffusion externalities between sectors. In fact,
in a recent work, Salomé Baslandze showed that while the direct
impact of the ICT revolution on US growth was of a limited
duration, this revolution has had a much longer-lasting indirect
effect. It has enabled companies in the most “high-tech” sectors,
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sectors, to improve the productivity of their production and
innovation activities. The effect of this diffusion of knowledge
has resulted in a reallocation of productive resources from tradi-
tional sectors to these “high-tech” sectors, which has had a
significant and lasting impact on US growth (Baslandze, 2016).
— Globalization, which is contemporary with the ICT wave, has
significantly boosted the potential gains from innovation
(scaling effect) as well as the potential losses of not innovating
(competitive effect). It is therefore hardly surprising that in
recent decades we have witnessed an acceleration of innovation,
in quantity and also in quality, particularly with regard to the
volume and impact of patents. Akcigit et al. (2016) highlighted
the link between patent production and productivity growth.
— Nevertheless, this acceleration of innovation is not fully reflected
in the evolution of productivity growth, in particular because of
a measurement problem (Aghion et al., 2017). This measure-
ment problem is likely to be exacerbated when innovation is
accompanied by a high rate of creative destruction. Chart 1
below shows that the number of patent applications is positively
correlated with the growth of labour productivity in US states
where creative destruction2 is weaker, whereas the correlation is
negative in US states where creative destruction is stronger. The
same phenomenon is found when considering business sectors:
the correlation between patent production and productivity
growth is more positive in the sectors that experience the least
amount of creative destruction. 
Why does more creative destruction imply more errors in measuring
productivity growth? The reason is that, when analysing the growth of
the monetary value of the output of a sector or a country, statistical
institutes do not know how to distinguish between what results from
inflation and what reflects the real growth in the value of goods. With
regard to an object that remains the same from yesterday to today or
an object that is modified only at the margins between yesterday and
today, we can easily distinguish what is due to inflation and what
corresponds to a real improvement in the good's quality. But how is
2. Creative destruction is measured as the average of the number of jobs created and the number
of jobs destroyed (US data Quarterly Workforce Indicators series).
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yesterday and today? In this case, the statistical offices systematically
use imputation: in other words, for each category of goods, the statis-
tics institutes calculate the inflation rate based on the inflation
measured on the goods that have not been replaced between
yesterday and today. Then they extrapolate this measure by stating
that this rate of inflation is the inflation rate for all products, including
those that were replaced between yesterday and today. Yet it can be
shown that because of the use of extrapolation, the growth rate of
productivity in the United States has been underestimated by nearly
0.6 percentage point per year on average over the last thirty years
(Aghion et al., 2017). Similarly, in France over the last ten years, actual
growth in productivity exceeds measured productivity growth by
0.5 percentage point; in other words, actual growth is twice the
measured growth (Aghion et al., 2018).
— Finally, our optimism about the prospects for future growth is
based on the observation that many countries, starting with
ours, are lagging in benefiting from the technological waves,
and benefiting only partly, in particular because of structural
rigidities and inappropriate economic policies. For example,
some countries have not fully transformed from catch-up econo-
mies into innovation economies. The comparison between
Chart 1. Correlation between patent applications and the growth of labour 
productivity in the United States, 1994-2010
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Technical Progress and Growth since the Crisis 61Sweden and Japan (Bergeaud et al., 2014) is particularly instruc-
tive: productivity growth is accelerating in Sweden, whereas it is
slowing down in Japan (Chart 2).   
Moreover, innovation and policies to promote innovation can be
used to act not only on supply, but also on demand, and avoid the situ-
ation described by Summers, namely stagnation characterized by a
liquidity trap and insufficient aggregate demand. Thus, Benigno and
Fornaro (2015) used a Keynesian-inspired model to show that two
stationary states can be reached: on the one hand, a stationary state
characterized by a full employment equilibrium and growth that meets
Chart 2. Trend in factor productivity growth in Sweden and Japan
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this equilibrium, the weakness of aggregate demand depresses invest-
ment in innovation, pulling the nominal interest rate to zero and
perpetuating weak aggregate demand. To determine the equilibrium
that will be chosen, Benigno and Fornaro emphasize the crucial role of
expectations: when agents anticipate low growth, and thus low
income, this leads to a decrease in aggregate demand, and therefore a
decline in corporate profits and investment. Unfavourable expectations
may thus create the conditions for a stagnation characterized by low
aggregate demand, involuntary unemployment and inefficient mone-
tary policy. On the other hand, policies to encourage and subsidize
innovation can pull an economy out of the “stagnation trap”: innova-
tion not only acts on supply, but also boosts expectations and
stimulates aggregate demand. 
3. Structural Reforms and Macroeconomic Policies
The US economy has proved more resilient than the European
economy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Some have blamed
the lack of macroeconomic responsiveness in Europe, while others
have pointed to France's slow pace in adopting structural reforms that
would have affected potential growth. In the face of a recession, there
are in fact always those who on the one hand advocate stimulus poli-
cies (notably using the deficit and public spending) and on the other
those who advocate a state withdrawal, except for guaranteeing the
regulation of the markets.
Our feeling is that both factors are in play simultaneously; in
particular, persistent rigidities in the goods and labour markets reduce
the impact of any “proactive” macroeconomic policy. Basically, we are
just paraphrasing the European Central Bank President Mario Draghi,
who declared two years ago at Bretton Woods that the ECB could carry
only half the load by easing its monetary policy, and that it was up to
the States to do the other half by undertaking reform.
To encourage companies to innovate, it is crucial to reform the
products market: according to the IMF, this would have a greater
impact than labour market reform. An analysis of labour market
reforms shows that these have only a relatively modest effect on
productivity and GDP (see Barnes et al., 2011; Bouis and Duval, 2011),
especially if the public expenditures associated with these measures are
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the other hand, according to the IMF's Global Integrated Monetary
and Fiscal Model (GIMF), if labour market reform is accompanied by
product market reform, then the potential for growth rises sharply. In
the euro zone, the simultaneous reform of the goods and products
market would increase GDP by 4.1 percentage points after 5 years,3
and by 12.3 points in the long term (Schindler et al., 2014).
In fact, the preliminary results of research conducted by Aghion,
Farhi and Kharroubi (2017) suggest a complementarity between struc-
tural reforms and a more counter-cyclical monetary policy (with lower
interest rates during a recession and higher interest rates during an
expansion). A counter-cyclical monetary policy is conducive to growth,
especially in sectors subject to credit constraints or liquidity constraints.
It reduces the amount of liquidity that entrepreneurs must set aside to
guard against future liquidity risk. Moreover, the effect will be stronger
in countries with weaker regulation of the goods market.4 Conversely,
when the goods market is highly regulated, the cyclical evolution of
short-term interest rates has no impact on growth: companies benefit
from extra income and are not sensitive to changes in financial condi-
tions. In addition, the unexpected decline in yields on government
bonds in the euro zone countries – following the ECB's announcement
of the Monetary Securities Transaction programme (MST) in
September 2012 – had a much stronger impact on the growth of the
most indebted sectors, but only in countries that had weak regulation
of the goods and services markets. In countries with strict regulation,
the fall in yields had either no effect or a positive effect on the least
indebted sectors. The regulation of the goods and services market has
thus diverted the financing of the ECB from the indebted sectors to the
sectors benefiting from extra income.
In other words, by being bolder about structural reform, we will not
only encourage our German neighbours and the ECB to accept more
flexible macroeconomic policies, but above all we will increase the
extra growth to be expected from this macroeconomic easing.
3. Reform of the goods market alone (or the labour market) would increase GDP by 1.7 points
(respectively 1.4 points) after 5 years.
4. Regulatory intensity is measured using the OECD Barriers to Trade and Industry indicator
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In recent decades, income inequality in the developed countries has
increased at an accelerating pace, particularly at the top of the income
ladder: the “top 1%” has seen its share of total income rise rapidly.
Various explanations have been proposed to account for this fact, but
these have not always adequately taken account of the data and empir-
ical analysis. The strong correlation between inequality and innovation
reflects that innovation has a causal link with extreme inequality: the
revenue from innovation contributes significantly to the growing share
of income held by the “top 1%” (Aghion et al., 2015). It is crucial to
understand that the increase in the “top 1%” results partly from inno-
vation and not only from land and speculative rents. Innovation
increases inequality, but it also has virtues that other sources of high
income do not necessarily have.
First, innovation is the main driver of growth in developed econo-
mies. This is largely supported by empirical studies, which show an
increasing correlation between growth and R&D investments and
between growth and patent flows as a country moves closer to the
technological frontier. Second, while it is true that in the short term
innovation benefits those who have generated or permitted it, in the
long run the benefits of innovation are dissipated because of imitation
and creative destruction (replacement by new innovations) and
because patents expire after 20 years. In other words, the inequality
generated by innovation is temporary in nature. Third, the link between
innovation and creative destruction means that innovation generates
social mobility: it allows new talent to enter the market and to oust
(partially or totally) existing firms. It is interesting, in this regard, to note
that, in the United States, California (which is currently the most inno-
vative US state) is well ahead of Alabama (which is among the least
innovative US states) both in terms of income inequality at the top 1%
of the income scale and in terms of social mobility.
Overall, then, innovation propels its beneficiaries into the highest
segments of the income distribution, and at the same time innovation
stimulates social mobility.
How can growth be reconciled with innovation and social mobility?
One promising approach might be to first identify the levers of growth
in the context of the economy in question, and then to analyse the
effects of each of the levers of growth on the various measures of
inequality: income inequality in the broad sense (Gini, etc.), the share of
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We have seen that innovation affects these different measures of
inequality differently, and in particular that it increases social mobility. 
It turns out that the main levers of growth through innovation have
a positive effect on social mobility. These levers have been identified in
previous studies5 as education (especially higher education), a more
dynamic labour market and a more competitive goods and services
market, and innovation-friendly taxation. What is the effect of these
different levers of growth on social mobility?
Education is “inclusive” in that it tends to increase social mobility
and reduce income inequality in a broad sense: Chetty et al. (2014)
show how, for example, social mobility is positively correlated with the
results obtained in educational tests.
Perhaps more surprising is the fact that the flexibility of both the
labour market and the products market also appear to favour social
mobility, as shown in Chart 3 below, based on the ongoing work of
5. Cf. Philippe Aghion, Gilbert Cette, Elie Cohen and Jean Pisani-Ferry, 2007, Les leviers de la
croissance française, Paris, La Documentation Française.
Chart 3. Social mobility and the creative destruction of businesses 
in the United States
Sources: The corporate data is based on the survey data Business Dynamics Statistics and the data on social mobility is
from the Equality of Opportunity Project.
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destruction increases, the difference in outcomes between children
from high-income families and children from low-income families
decreases, and consequently social mobility increases.
This is encouraging news: the levers of growth through innovation
also have the virtue of stimulating social mobility. Finally, one thing is
certain in the light of our previous discussion: tackling innovation
through inadequate taxation is tantamount to reducing not only
growth but also social mobility.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we examined three debates rekindled by the crisis of
2008: the debate on secular stagnation, the debate on the relationship
between macroeconomic policy and structural reform, and the debate
on widening inequalities and the link between inequalities, innovation
and growth.
We have tried to explain how, in each of these debates, the
Schumpeterian paradigm makes it possible to reason differently and
suggests both new questions about the growth process and some solu-
tions in terms of growth policies.
First, our discussion of secular stagnation has led us to believe that
productivity increases are not measured correctly and are in fact largely
underestimated, and that overall while our economies are actually
subject to secular trends, linked to the diffusion of new technological
revolutions, it is difficult to speak of stagnation once growth has been
correctly measured.
Our discussion on macroeconomic policy and structural reform
showed that there is complementarity between macroeconomic poli-
cies (fiscal and/or monetary) that are more reactive to the economic
cycle, and structural reforms that promote fluid markets: this is what
we call the “Draghi approach”.
Finally, our analysis of the relationship between innovation and
inequality has shown that while innovation helps to increase the share
of the top 1% in a country's total income, at the same time innovation
and the reforms underpinning it tend to stimulate social mobility by
virtue of creative destruction. As a result, a smart fiscal policy must treat
Technical Progress and Growth since the Crisis 67innovation differently from other sources that increase inequality at the
top of the income ladder.   
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